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How NOT TO REFORM JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: DAVIS,
WHITE, AND THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCING
JAMES BoPP, JR.t & JOSIAH NEELEYtt
INTRODUCTION
Judicial elections are nothing new. Thirty states select some or all
of their judges through elections, and the practice of electing judges has
been common since the early days of the republic.1 There are good rea-
sons to do so. Since state court judges have a robust role in making law
through the development of common law, democratic theory requires
2that they do so with the consent of the people through elections. Elec-
tions make sure that judges are accountable to the people, rather than
political elites and insiders.3 And judicial elections also provide a means
for the people to keep judges within their legitimate bounds by providing
an opportunity for the people to remove judicial activists from the
bench.4
Despite this history and the significant benefits of judicial elections,
some commentators have raised concerns about the practice of judicial
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Law Practice Group of the Federalist Society; Commissioner, National Conference of Commission-
ers of Uniform State Laws. Mr. Bopp argued Republican Party of Minnesota v. White in the United
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1. Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States. A Special Report, 64
JUDICATURE 176, 176-78 (1980) reprinted and updated in AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL
POLITICS: READINGS FROM JUDICATURE 44-45 (Elliot E. Slotnick ed., 2d ed. 1999), available at
http://books.google.com/ (search "Search Books" for "Judicial Politics"; then follow "Judicial Poli-
tics: Readings from Judicature" hyperlink).
2. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) ("Not only do state-court
judges possess the power to 'make' common law, but they have the immense power to shape the
States' constitutions as well. Which is precisely why the election of state judges became popular.")
(citations omitted); see also James Bopp, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence: Judicial Elections
as the Antidote to Judicial Activism, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 180, 181-82 (2007) ("[J]udicial
elections are different from elections for the legislative or executive branch in a very important way
because, unlike other public officials, judges have a dual role. One of the roles that state court judges
share with the political branches is to make law, most notably in the development of the common
law.").
3. See Bopp, supra note 2, at 185 ("If judges were given a predominant role in setting public
policy, then it would deny popular sovereignty and democracy to make them independent of appro-
priate accountability to the people.").
4. Id. at 190-91 (citing instances of judges who were defeated at the polls based on judicial
activism).
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elections.5 Chief among these concerns has been the way in which judi-
cial elections are financed.6 To some extent, objections to private fund-
raising by judges and judicial candidates are pedestrian. Fundraising is
unpleasant and time consuming for candidates and awkward for potential
contributors.7 Other objections, such as that privately funded judicial
campaigns erode public confidence in the judiciary, are, if true, much
more serious.
In this article, we examine both the supposed ills of a privately fi-
nanced judicial election system, as well as one possible cure: public
funding of judicial elections. Part I looks at the current system of pri-
vately funded judicial campaigns. We argue that a common criticism of
this system-that it leads to corruption and imperils judicial impartial-
ity-is overblown. In Part II, we look at two methods currently used to
fight alleged corruption within the privately funded system: (1) contribu-
tion limits, and (2) restrictions on personal solicitation by candidates.
We argue that contribution limits are constitutional, so long as the limits
are high enough to allow candidates to wage an effective campaign. We
conclude that bans on personal solicitation by candidates, however, do
not serve an interest in preventing corruption and are inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White.8 Part III looks at public funding of judicial elections. We con-
clude that while public funding of judicial elections is not per se uncon-
stitutional, many public funding schemes contain features, such as the
provision of so-called "rescue funds" based on spending by a publicly
funded candidate's opponent or by an independent group, as well as bur-
densome asymmetrical disclosure requirements needed to effectuate res-
cue funds, which are unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Davis v. FEC.9
I. WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS?
Criticism of the role of money in judicial campaigns comes in a va-
riety of forms. Many such objections are quotidian. Candidates gener-
ally do not enjoy asking others for money, and the costs of fundraising to
the candidate both in money and in time can be significant. Those solic-
ited may feel uncomfortable turning down contribution requests. And
some people may feel a general uneasiness about the level of spending
5. E.g., Roy A. Schotland, Professor of Law, Georgetown University, Remarks at the Con-
ference entitled Bulwarks of the Republic: Judicial Independence and Accountability in the Ameri-
can System of Justice (December 1998), in 61 SUM. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998)
(arguing that judicial elections have gotten "nastier, noisier, and costlier" in recent years).
6. See generally RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 61-80 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
7. See generally Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government
Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 LOY, U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2006).
8. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
9. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
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on political campaigns divorced from any specific objection. While
these sorts of criticisms may explain some of the hostility to the idea of
privately funded judicial campaigns, they hardly justify the degree of
opposition that this system has endangered.
Two objections, however, are more serious. First, it is claimed that
campaign contributions threaten judicial impartiality.' 0 If a judge re-
ceives a contribution from a particular individual or group, it is argued,
he will be more likely to rule in favor of that individual or group should
they appear before him as litigants." Money, then, tips the scales of
justice towards certain parties and away from others not according to the
merits of their claims, but according to the size of their contributions.
Corruption is a serious charge, and serious charges demand serious
evidence. To date, however, evidence supporting claims of corruption
based on contributions has been mixed at best.' 2 Judges are human be-
ings, and it is always possible that they may be influenced by factors
other than the law and the facts of a given case. 13 Judges can be tempted
to alter their decisions in order to get re-elected,' 4 to receive appointment
to higher office,' 5 or even simply to receive praise or avoid criticism.'
6
10. Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 6, at 140, 140; see also Penny J. White & Malia Reddick, A
Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The Rest of the Story, 75 TENN. L. REV. 501, 542 (2008) ("Ac-
cording to recent national surveys, between two-thirds and three-fourths of Americans believe that
the need to raise money to conduct their campaigns influences judges' decisions."); George D.
Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1560-61 (2008) (surveying popular opinion polls in New York,
Ohio, & Pennsylvania, as well as a national poll, which show registered voters believing judges
influenced by campaign contributions ranging from 75 percent to 95 percent); Thomas J. Basting,
Sr., Gutter Politics and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, WiS. LAW., May 2008, at 5 (citing a January
2008 survey in which 78 percent of Wisconsin registered voters believed that campaign funding
influenced judges' decisions).
11. Brown. supra note 10, at 1563 ("Public perception of [state courts] as places where all
citizens can receive impartial justice may falter. Extensive campaign promises and political debts
may lead to prejudgment. Campaign contributions, in particular, may create a class of favored
litigants."). Curiously, those who support public funding of elections do not likewise conclude that
government contributions will make a judge more likely to rule in favor of the government. See
Jessica Gall, Living with Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The Birth and Death of the Judi-
cial Campaign Speech Restrictions, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 97, 120 (2008) (suggesting that a candi-
dates agreement to participate in public funding of judicial campaigns could "lessen the suspicions
of ties between money and judicial behavior.").
12. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394 (2000) (noting conflict among
academic studies on the effect of contributions on candidate behavior).
13. Del Vecchio v. 111. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Judges are hu-
man; like all humans, their outlooks are shaped by their lives' experiences. It would be unrealistic to
suppose that judges do not bring to the bench those experiences and the attendant biases they may
create.").
14. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002) (noting that "elected
judges ... always face the pressure of an electorate who might disagree with their rulings and there-
fore vote them off the bench.") (emphasis in original).
15. See Guido Calabresi, Circuit Justice, 2d Cir., Remarks at Roundtable Discussion, Is There
a Threat to Judicial Independence in the United States Today?, in 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7, 26
(1998) ("If I were to identify the single greatest threat to judicial independence today, it would be the
fact that judges want to move up.").
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The danger to impartiality posed by such a judge is present under any
system of judicial selection, and there is no reason to believe that cam-
paign contributions pose a particularly strong danger in this regard.' 7 To
limit the danger that judges will succumb to temptation, courts have
adopted various structural checks to limit the risk of injustice caused by
the occasional "bad judge."1 8  Ultimately, though, our judicial system
presupposes that judges will take seriously the duty of their office to de-
cide cases fairly and impartially. 19
In addition to threatening actual impartiality, campaign contribu-
tions are said to threaten the perception of impartiality by the general
public. This threat is particularly acute in the case of the judiciary be-
cause of its inherent weakness as a constitutional actor. As famously
stated by Alexander Hamilton, the judiciary is the "least dangerous"
branch, as it has "no influence over either the sword or the purse., 20
Because courts have neither the power to levy taxes nor command ar-
mies, the only way for their decisions to have effect is if they are widely
perceived as being impartial arbiters of justice rather than mere political
actors.2'
As with charges of actual corruption, however, the evidence to sup-
port this argument is largely lacking. Polling data has consistently
shown a generalized public cynicism about government institutions.22
16. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 988-89
(2001) (noting a case where public criticism of a judge's decision regarding the admissibility of
evidence led the judge to change his ruling).
17. Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign
Speech By Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 258 (1987) ("A sitting judge who
is willing to manipulate his decisions in order to assure retention in office will find the opportunity
to do so in either an appointive or an elective system."); see also Jonathan M. Hooks, In Defense of
Judicial Elections, 68 ALA. LAW. 295, 298 (2007) (noting the error of thinking that "the elimination
of elections will somehow result in the elimination of ambition.") (emphasis in original),
18. James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, An Announce Clause By Any Other Name: The
Unconstitutionality of Disciplining Judges Who Fail to Disqualify Themselves For Exercising Their
Freedom to Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723, 727 (2007) ("A judge who is biased in favor of a particu-
lar side in a case cannot simply rule in favor of that case. A judge must provide a legal rationale for
his decision, the weaknesses of which will often become readily apparent. The law also provides for
a wide-ranging system of appeals in which legal errors committed by a judge due to bias can be
corrected. Many cases are also heard by multiple judges, further diluting the chance that bias from
an individual judge will lead to an incorrect result.").
19. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 562 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[W]e ac-
cept the notion that the 'conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make himself aware of his
biases of this character, and, by that very self-knowledge, nullify their effect.' The acquired skill
and capacity to disregard extraneous matters is one of the requisites of judicial office." (citation
omitted) (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1943))); Del Vecchio v. Ill.
Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We expect-even demand--that judges rise
above these potential biasing influences, and in most cases we presume judges do.").
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
21. James L. Gibson, Nastier, Nosier, Costlier-And Better, MILLER-MCCUNE, August 2008,
at 27, available at http://www.miller-mccune.com/article/495 ("Because courts are weak, they
require institutional legitimacy, the belief that an institution has the right to make binding decisions
for a constituency and that such decisions must be complied with.").
22. E.g., AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION
AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: ARE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CROOKED 1958-2004 (2005),
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This is a good thing. Cynicism about the actions and motives of gov-
ernment officials can serve as a powerful check on the abuse of govern-
ment power,23 including by the judiciary.24  And while some degree of
perceived legitimacy is obviously necessary not only for the judicial but
for other branches of government, experience has shown that democracy
and cynicism about government institutions generally are capable of co-
existing in the same society indefinitely.
The assumption that public concerns about campaign contributions
translates into a lack of confidence in the judiciary is also not supported
by the evidence. A 2002 poll by the American Bar Association, for ex-
ample, found that 72% of respondents were at least "somewhat con-
cerned" about whether "the impartiality of judges is compromised by the
need to raise campaign money to successfully run for office. 25 Yet, the
same poll found that 75% of respondents thought elected judges were
more fair and impartial than appointed judges.26  According to a recent
poll, only five percent of respondents believed campaign contributions
made to judges had no influence at all on decisions judges made in Min-
nesota state courts. 27 Nonetheless, the same poll found widespread pub-
lic confidence in the courts, with 74% of respondents saying that they
had "a great deal" or "some" confidence in the courts, and 76% saying
that they had "a great deal" or "some" confidence in judges (higher rates
than for any other category except the medical profession). 28 The courts
are consistently among the highest ranked institutions in terms of public
confidence. 29  And while the majority of Americans will express some
http://electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_4.htm (finding that, in 2004, 35% of respondents
thought "quite a few of the people running the government are crooked," while 53% thought "not
many" were crooked, and 10% said "hardly any" were crooked).
23. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (noting the "the value that free speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in
checking the abuse of power by public officials."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison),
supra note 20, at 80 ("It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not
always be at the helm.").
24. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ('The assumption that respect for the
judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
American public opinion .... [A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of pre-
serving the dignify [sic] of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt
much more than it would enhance respect.").
25. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., HARRIS INTERACTIVE TELEPHONE OMNIBUS SURVEY: A
STUDY ABOUT JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY, PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 6 (Au-
gust 2002) (on file with author).
26. Id. at 4.
27. DECISION RESOURCES LTD., JUSTICE AT STAKE STUDY, MINNESOTA STATEWIDE 5
(2008), http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/MinnesotaJusticeatStakesurvey.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2008). This despite the fact that Minnesota prohibited judges and judicial candidates from person-
ally soliciting campaign contributions.
28. Id. at 1-2.
29. According to a 2001-2002 survey, 96% of respondents rated the job being done by courts
and judges of their state as being either "excellent" or "good." JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,
STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE (Nov. 5, 2001-Jan. 2, 2002) (on file with author). A
1999 survey found that 77% of respondents had either "a great deal" or "some" confidence in the
United States Supreme Court, and 75% had similar confidence in local courts. And, 79% agreed
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level of concern about the potentially corrupting effect of money in elec-
tions, this does not appear to be their most pressing concern.30
II. STOPPING CORRUPTION WITHIN A PRIVATELY FUNDED SYSTEM
While privately funded judicial elections may not be perfect, cam-
paign contributions are a necessary part of the judicial election process.
Campaigns cost money.31 So long as judges are elected, funding for their
campaigns is going to have to come from somewhere. As former Su-
preme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has noted, "[u]nless the pool
of judicial candidates is limited to those wealthy enough to independ-
ently fund their campaigns, a limitation unrelated to judicial skill, the
cost of campaigning requires judicial candidates to engage in fundrais-in g.32
States have traditionally sought to combat any risk of corruption
from campaign contributions by placing limits on judicial fundraising,
rather than by abolishing it altogether. First, most states place limits on
the size of contributions that can legally be made to a candidate by an
individual or group. 33 Second, many states prohibit judicial candidates
themselves from soliciting campaign contributions and require all such
solicitations to be done through a committee.3 4
A. Contribution Limits
A majority of states place limits on the amount of at least some
forms of contributions to judicial candidates.35 While contribution limits
"implicate fundamental First Amendment interests," namely the free-
doms of 'political expression" and "political association,, 36 they can be
constitutional, as long as there is a demonstrable relationship between the
size of the contributions allowed and a realistic threat of corruption, and
with the statement that "[j]udges are generally honest and fair in deciding cases." NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL
SURVEY (1999) available at http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications/ResAmtPTCPublicView
CrtsPub.pdf.
30. Scott Rasmussen, 55% Say Media Bias Bigger Problem Than Campaign Cash, Aug. 11,
2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.comnpublic-Content/politics/election-20082/2008-presidential
election/55_say-media -bias bigger..problem thanscampaign_cash (last visited Oct. 22, 2008)
(reporting poll finding 55% of respondents thought media bias posed a bigger problem in politics
than large campaign contributions).
31. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (1 1th Cir. 2002) ("Campaigning for elected
office necessarily entails raising campaign funds and seeking endorsements from prominent figures
and groups in the community.").
32. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789-90 (2002).
33. See American Judicature Soc., Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Campaign Financing,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selectionlcampaigns.and-elections/campaign-financing.cf
m?state= (last visited October 19, 2008).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).
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they are not so low as to prevent "candidates and political committees
from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.,
37
To the extent that large campaign contributions do pose an actual
threat to judicial impartiality, reasonable contribution limits are an effec-
tive means of dealing with this threat. A judge is not likely to be swayed
in favor of a particular litigant by the fact that the litigant has given him a
small contribution in the past, nor by the hope of receiving a similarly
sized contribution in the future.
B. Restrictions on Personal Solicitation by Judicial Candidates
In addition to limiting the amount of contributions, many states pro-
hibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contribu-
tions, while allowing their campaign committee to make contribution
solicitations. The extent to which this committee system actually insu-
lates judges and judicial candidates from the supposed dangers of fund-
raising is unclear. Bans on personal solicitation by judicial candidates
do, however, allow states to maintain the fiction that judges are not di-
rectly involved in the campaign fundraising process.
Early cases involving bans on personal solicitation by judicial can-
didates tended to uphold the provisions against constitutional chal-
lenges.38 The legal landscape governing judicial elections changed dra-
matically, however, in 2002, when the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,39 involving a First
Amendment challenge to a Minnesota judicial canon barring judicial
candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political
issues. Previous cases had split on the question of whether a canon
prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views was consti-
tutional.4' In White, however, the Supreme Court held that the Announce
Clause violated the First Amendment.
Central to the Court's opinion in White was an analysis of the dif-
ferent possible state interests that fell under the term "judicial impartial-
ity." As traditionally understood, judicial impartiality referred to impar-
tiality towards parties and prohibited a judge from hearing a case when
42she had a bias for or against one of the litigants. This interest, the
Court held, was compelling and grew out of the right of due process,
which would be violated if a litigant was forced to have his case heard by
37. Id. at 21; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 233 (2006) (finding Vermont contribu-
tion limits so low as to impede candidates' right to effective advocacy); see generally James Bopp,
Jr & Susan Lee, So There Are Campaign Contribution Limits That Are Too Low, 18 STAN. L. &
POLY REV. 266 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 138 (3rd Cir. 1991).
39. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
40. Id. at 768.
41. Compare Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225, with Stretton, 944 F.2d at 138.
42. White, 536 U.S. at 775-76.
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a judge biased against him personally or biased in favor of his opponent
in the case.43 While White held that the state did have a compelling in-
terest in preserving judicial impartiality towards parties, it concluded that
the Announce Clause was "barely tailored to serve that interest at all,
inasmuch as it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties,
but rather speech for or against particular issues."
44
The White court also considered the possibility that judicial imparti-
ality could be defined in two non-standard senses. First, the Court con-
sidered whether impartiality includes a lack of preconceptions on legal
issues. Some had argued that just as a judge might be biased for or
against a particular party, so she might be biased for or against a particu-
lar conclusion regarding a legal issue. The Court found, however, that
the state's interest in judicial impartiality did not include a lack of pre-
conceptions on legal issues, as having a judge with no such preconcep-
tions was neither possible nor desirable.46
Finally, the Court considered whether judicial impartiality included
judicial open-mindedness. Open-mindedness would require of a judge
"not that he have no preconceptions on legal issues, but that he be willing
to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to
persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case. 47 Judicial open-
mindedness "seeks to guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win
the legal points in the case, but at least some chance of doing so. ' '48 The
Supreme Court declined to state whether open-mindedness was encom-
passed within the state's impartiality interest, holding instead that the
Announce Clause was not narrowly tailored to that interest and thus
could not be justified by it in any event.
49
White went on to note that to the extent judges announcing their
views on disputed legal and political issues did raise impartiality con-
cerns, those concerns were inherent in the state's decision to elect judges
in the first place. Quoting Justice Marshall, the Court stated that "[i]f the
State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democ-
ratic process, it must accord the participants in that process ... the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles., 50 The White Court there-
fore concluded that states cannot use the impartiality concerns created by
43. Id. at 776
44. Id.
45. Id. at 777.
46. See id. at 778 ("Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not
lack of bias." (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
47. White, 536 U.S. at 778.
48. Id.
49. Id. ("It may well be that impartiality in this sense, and the appearance of it, are desirable
in the judiciary, but we need not pursue that inquiry, since we do not believe the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose.").
50. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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their decision to popularly elect judges to justify restricting First
Amendment rights.51
Since White, federal courts have struck down a variety of state judi-
cial canons on First Amendment grounds.52 In particular, four federal
courts-two district courts and two courts of appeals-have enjoined
state judicial canons prohibiting judicial candidates from personally so-
liciting campaign contributions.53
Like the Announce Clause, a judicial canon banning personal solici-
tation of funds by candidates "depends wholly upon the subject matter of
the speech for its invocation. As such, a solicitation clause is a con-
tent-based regulation of core political speech subject to strict scrutiny.
55
And while the justification for the solicitation clause-that there is a
danger a judge will be biased in favor of a litigant or attorney if he
knows that she has donated money to his campaign-might seem to be
addressed to preserving judicial impartiality toward parties in a way the
Announce Clause was not, federal courts since White have held that the
56solicitation clause is not narrowly tailored to that interest. The reason
for this is simple. What raises impartiality concerns is not the solicita-
tion of funds, but rather a judge's knowledge of the source of the contri-
bution itself. Since judges can know, and are often legally required to
know,57 who has donated money to their campaigns and in what amount,
banning judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds does nothing
51. See id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Minnesota has chosen to select its judges
through contested popular elections .... In doing so the State has voluntarily taken on the risks to
judicial bias described above. As a result, the State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict
judges' speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling, If the State has a
problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the
practice of popularly electing judges.").
52. See Republican Party v. White (White 11), 416 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cit. 2005); Family Trust
Found. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224, 226-27 (6th Cit. 2004) (order denying stay
of preliminary injunction); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319-20, 1322 (1lth Cir. 2002);
Carey v. Wolnitzek, 2008 WL 4602786 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2008); Bauer v. Shepard, No. 3:08-CV-
196-TLS, slip op. at 20 (N.D. Ind. May 6, 2008) (preliminary injunction granted); Duwe v. Alexan-
der, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp.2d
879, 890 (N.D. Ind. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Kan. Judicial
Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1232 (D. Kan. 2006) (preliminary injunction granted); Alaska
Right to Life v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (D. Alaska 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 504
F.3d 840 (9th Cit. 2007); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042 (D. N.D.
2005); Family Trust Found. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 694 (E.D. Ky. 2004); Spargo v. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp.2d 72, 88-90 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other
grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003); Smith v. Phillips, No. A-02 CV 111 JRN, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14913, *1-3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2002); O'Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir.
2008).
53. White 11, 416 F.3d at 765; Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322; Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-
KKC, slip op. at *22 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006); Kan. Judicial Watch, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1237, in-
junction modifiedon standing grounds by 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cit. 2008).
54. White I, 416 F.3d at 763 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 763-64; Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322.
56. See cases cited supra note 55.
57. See, e.g., White I, 416 F.3d at 766 n.16 (noting that "very specific information about
campaign contributions are [sic] publicly available, notably on the Internet").
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to further a state's interest in preserving judicial impartiality towards
58parties. In addition, as with the Announce Clause, any impartiality
concerns raised by the personal solicitation of campaign funds are inher-
ent in the state's decision to elect judges and cannot be used as a ration-
ale to limit candidates' First Amendment rights.59
Post-White, two state courts have upheld solicitation clauses against
constitutional challenge. In re Dunleavy60 upheld Maine's solicitation
clause against First Amendment challenge by potential contributors, but
did not consider whether the provision violated judicial candidates' First
Amendment rights. Additionally, Dunleavy's holding was explicitly
made contingent on the fact that judges in Maine were not elected.61 The
case is thus of limited applicability.
The Arkansas Supreme Court also recently upheld the state's solici-
tation clause in Simes v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission,62 partially on the grounds that "[a]ttorneys ought not feel
pressured to support certain judicial candidates in order to represent their
clients. 63 This reasoning is out of step with the White decision and its
progeny, as it attempts to justify the solicitation clause not because of the
effect such solicited contributions might have on candidates, but rather
because of concern about the subjective feelings of those solicited. The
state does have an interest in preventing corruption, and, therefore, could
justifiably prohibit contributions that were solicited as part of a quid pro
quo. Similarly, the state undoubtedly has an interest in preventing actual
coercion of contributions by candidates. Whether protecting attorneys'
subjective feelings of pressure is a compelling state interest sufficient to
justify restricting political speech, however, is doubtful.
64
58. See Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23 ("[Elven if there is a risk that judges will be tempted to
rule a particular way because of contributions or endorsements, this risk is not significantly reduced
by allowing the candidate's agent to seek these contributions and endorsements on the candidate's
behalf rather than the candidate seeking them himself. Successful candidates will feel beholden to
the people who helped them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of support."); see also
Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, slip op. at *18 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006) ("Even with the
prohibition against direct solicitations, however, judges are able to find out who contributed to their
campaigns and the amounts they contributed. Thus, if a judge is predisposed to favoring those
parties who agree to make contributions, the Solicitation Clause's prohibition against personal solici-
tation does not prevent such actual partiality.").
59. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon
itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."); see also Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322
("The impartiality concerns, if any, are created by the State's decision to elect judges publicly.").
60. 838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003).
61. Id. at 349 ("The Committee correctly notes an important distinction between the restric-
tions at issue in White and Weaver and this case. Both of those cases concerned restrictions on
candidates for judicial office in states where judges are elected.").
62. 247 S.W.3d 876 (Ark. 2007).
63. Id. at 882.
64. Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, slip op. at *18 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006) ("This
Court finds no compelling state interest in prohibiting speech that makes it easier for potential do-
nors to 'just say no."').
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It should be noted that feeling pressured to contribute is in no way
confined to contributions solicited by judicial candidates. A person may
"feel pressured" to support a candidate for legislative or executive office.
In fact, the felt coercion could arguably be greater in the case of legisla-
tive or executive office candidates because it is generally unknown prior
to an election whether a judge will ever sit on a case involving a potential
contributor, whereas legislators and executive officers have the authority
to influence the law on whatever matters they so choose. The state's
assertion of this interest only in the context of judicial elections suggests
that it is insincere, or, in constitutional terms, is fatally underinclusive.65
Challenges to state solicitation clauses are currently pending in five
states. 66 When Wisconsin amended its judicial canons in 2004, two jus-
tices dissented from the amendments relating to the solicitation clause,
arguing that the comprehensive ban on solicitation by judges and judicial
candidates likely violated the First Amendment.67 And in 2006, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court rejected a request to add a ban on personal solicita-
tion to its state judicial code, citing First Amendment concerns. Given
the emerging legal landscape post-White, state bans on candidate solicita-
tion of campaign contributions cannot be considered an appropriate or
effective means of safeguarding the judiciary from the purportedly cor-
rupting effect of contributions.
I1. THE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC FUNDING
In the previous section, we considered two ways in which states
have tried to limit any perceived negative effects of campaign contribu-
tions while keeping their system of privately funded judicial campaigns.
In this section, we turn to a more radical solution to the problems of
campaign contributions in judicial races: public funding of elections.68
Public funding would seem to address the worries about the effect
of money in judicial races, while still allowing states to tap the account-
ability and legitimizing force that elections can bring. In 2002, the
American Bar Association endorsed the concept of public funding and
recommended that individual states adopt public funding schemes suited
65. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994) (noting that underinclusiveness "di-
minish[es] the credibility of the government's rationale for restricting speech"); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) ("As a means of pursuing the objective of open-
mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to
render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.") (citations omitted).
66. See Wolfson v. Brammer, No. 08-CV-8064-FJM (D. Ariz. 2008); Bauer v. Shepard, No.
08-CV-196-TLS (N.D. id. 2008); Wersal v. Sexton, No. 08-CV-613-ADM-JSM (D. Minn. 2008);
Siefert v. Alexander, No. 08-CV-126-BBC (W.D. Wis. 2008); Yost v. Stout, No. 06-CV-4122-JAR-
KGS (D. Kan. 2006).
67. In the Matter of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 60, Code of Judi-
cial Conduct-Campaigns, Elections, Political Activity, 2004 WI 134 (Wis. 2004)
68. See generally Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of
Judges and the Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (2003).
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to their particular state circumstances. 69 According to the report, of the
"many threats to judicial independence, one of the more pervasive prob-
lems is the nature and cost of running for the bench., 70 That same year,
North Carolina became the first state in the nation to provide for full
public funding for all state judicial offices. 7 1 Since then, only New Mex-
72ico has adopted public funding for judicial races. Several other states,
however, are currently considering public funding proposals, many of
which are modeled off of the North Carolina scheme.73
Public funding of elections is not per se unconstitutional.74  States
generally have broader authority when it comes to the distribution of
public funds than in the case of regulation, and so long as they do not
engage in viewpoint discrimination, a state may choose to give money to
candidates for particular public offices, at least when voluntarily contrib-
uted by taxpayers for this purpose.75 Simply giving money to candidates,
however, is unlikely to address the concerns raised about the current sys-
tem of campaign financing. Without some limit on the ability of candi-
dates to raise and spend private funds, candidates would be able to sim-
ply add what they receive in government funds to what they can raise
privately, severely disadvantaging any candidate who relied exclusively
on government funding to finance their campaigns.
To avoid this result, almost all public funding schemes make candi-
dates agree to abide by certain expenditure and contribution limits as a
69. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 38 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org
/judind/pdf/commissionreport4-03.pdf. The recommendations of the Commission report were ap-
proved by the ABA House of Delegates in February of 2002.
70. Id. at 61.
71. While Wisconsin has had public funding for state Supreme Court races since the 1970s,
public funding even for those races has been limited. See WIS. STAT. § 11.50(3)(a)(2) (2007). The
Wisconsin public funding scheme does not contain any provision for rescue funds based on opposing
expenditures. For a description of how the Wisconsin scheme operates, see Charles Gardner Geyh,
Publicly Funded Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1476-77 (2001).
72. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-13(D)(2), (1) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.001-70
(West 2007). Several states and localities have also adopted public funding schemes for certain
elections. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-901.01, -940 to -961 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 9-600 to -674, 9-700 to -751 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-217 to -225 (2008); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-30 to -47 (West 2008). A proposal
to adopt public funding for U.S. Senate races is currently before Congress. Fair Elections Now Act,
S. 936, 110th Cong. (2007).
73. See, e.g., H.B. 251, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2003); H.B. 4610, 49th Gen. Assem.,
2nd Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006); S.B. 171, 98th Leg., 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007).
74. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) ("Congress has power to regulate Presidential
elections and primaries, and public financing of Presidential elections as a means to reform the
electoral process was clearly a choice within the granted power .... Whether the chosen means
appear 'bad,' 'unwise,' or 'unworkable' to us is irrelevant.") (citation omitted); Davis v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm'n, 128 S. Ct., 2759, 2772 (2008).
75. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65 ("Congress may engage in public financing of
election campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate
to abide by specified expenditure limitations.").
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condition of receiving government funds.76 The Supreme Court has held
that this is constitutional so long as participation in the scheme remains
voluntary.77 To be voluntary, a public funding scheme must allow can-
didates the option of not participating in the system 78 and may not un-
constitutionally burden the First Amendment rights of candidates who
opt not to participate.79
A public funding scheme must also not burden the First Amend-
ment rights of independent groups. States cannot constitutionally place
limitations on the amount of independent expenditures made during a
campaign. 80 Public funding schemes that do burden First Amendment
rights are subject to strict scrutiny and will be deemed unconstitutional
unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 8'
While crafting a public funding scheme that meets these require-
ments may seem like a simple task, in practice, constructing a public
funding scheme that is both efficient and complies with the First
Amendment is not easy. States generally provide funds at a level compa-
rable to average spending in prior races. This amount, however, is often
based on all races, not just competitive ones, and does not account for
increased costs. This leaves the publicly funded candidate vulnerable to
higher spending by privately funded candidates or independent spenders.
This problem could be avoided if states were willing to provide publicly
funded candidates with sufficient funds to run an effective campaign.
However, few public funding schemes do this because one of the princi-
pal goals of public funding is to reduce the overall amount of campaign
spending. For this reason, many schemes make additional distributions
of public funds, called "rescue funds," to make up for the insufficiency
of their original government allotment. The use of rescue funds, how-
ever, proves upon examination to pose insurmountable constitutional
difficulties.
76. National Conference of State Legislatures, Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview
(2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/about/PubFinOverview.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2008).
77. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65 ("Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the
contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept public
funding.").
78. See Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[V]oluntariness has
proven to be an important factor in judicial ratification of government-sponsored campaign financing
schemes." (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-96)).
79. See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1425 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
ban on certain contributions to privately funded candidates was unconstitutional because it prevented
privately funded candidates from gaining access to funding sources to which they would be entitled
but for the choice to eschew public funding).
80. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 ("[1]ndependent advocacy ... does not presently appear to
pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions."); see also Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Buckley drew a
line in the sand, and prohibited the government from restricting a candidate's ability to make expen-
ditures on his own behalf.").
81. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
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A. The Problem of Rescue Funds
In order to "level the playing field" between a publicly funded can-
didate and her privately funded opponent, most public funding schemes
attempt to tie the level of government funding to the amount of money
spent in opposition to that candidate's campaign. For example, under
North Carolina's public funding scheme, once a candidate qualifies for
public funding, she receives an initial distribution based on the office the
candidate is seeking, whether or not she is opposed, and whether the
funds are to be used in a primary or a general election campaign.82 If the
publicly funded candidate faces no serious opposition, no further gov-
ernment funds are provided.83 However, additional government funds
are available to the candidate if the combined sum of (a) contributions
from a nonparticipating opponent, (b) independent expenditures 84 made
in support of that opponent, and (c) independent expenditures in opposi-
tion to the publicly funded candidate exceeds a certain trigger amount.
85
These "rescue funds, 86 are made in an "amount equal to the reported
excess. ' ' 7 That is, for every dollar spent by a privately funded candidate
or independent group on behalf of a privately funded candidate or in op-
position to a publicly funded candidate, the publicly funded candidate
receives a dollar of government contributions." Thus, under the rescue
funds provision, expenditures by a candidate can result in additional
government contributions to that candidate's opponent, and independent
expenditures made in opposition to a candidate or in support of her op-
ponent can, likewise, result in government contributions to the opposed
candidate.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.65(a)-(b) (West 2007).
83. Id. § 163-278.65(b)
84. An independent expenditure is defined as "an expenditure to support or oppose the nomi-
nation or election of one or more clearly identified candidates that is made without consultation or
coordination with a candidate or agent of a candidate whose nomination or election the expenditure
supports or whose opponent's nomination or election the expenditure opposes." N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 163-278.6(9a) (West 2007).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.67(a) (West 2007). The trigger amount is determined
by statute and, in the case of a general election, is equal to the amount of the initial distribution.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.62(18) (West 2007).
86. The name given to funds distributed in this way varies depending on the public funding
scheme. In North Carolina they were originally called "rescue funds," but were re-labeled "match-
ing funds" in 2007. See id. § 163-278.67. Other schemes refer to them by other names. See Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 936, 110th Cong. § 511 (2007) (providing "fair fight" funds to publicly
funded candidates based on opposition spending). None of these terms is entirely accurate. "Match-
ing funds" is too broad, as a public funding scheme can choose to give matching funds based on
something other than opposing expenditures. "Rescue funds" is not a completely neutral term, but at
least better conveys the conditions in which funds are granted. For lack of a better term, this article
will refer to government contributions to candidates based on opposing speech as rescue funds, and
to the portions of a public funding scheme providing for these rescue funds as the rescue funds
provision.
87. Id. § 163-278.67(a).
88. Id. Importantly, independent expenditures in support of a publicly funded candidate or in
opposition to a nonparticipating candidate are not factored into calculating the trigger amount, and
no rescue funds are issued to privately funded candidates nor deducted from a publicly funded can-
didate's government funding based upon independent expenditures so made. See id.
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Until recently, courts have been divided over whether First Amend-
ment rights are burdened by public funding schemes which provide res-
cue funds based on spending by privately funded candidates and inde-
pendent groups. The First and Fourth Circuits have found that providing
government funding to candidates based on opposition speech does not
burden First Amendment rights and is, therefore, constitutional,89 while
the Eighth and arguably the Ninth Circuit have found them constitution-
ally suspect.90 Treatment of the issue by other federal courts has often
been analytically confused, leaving the validity of rescue funds provi-
sions open to question. A brief summary of the relevant cases follows.
1. The Lower Courts
The first federal court case to address the rescue funds issue was
Day v. Holahan.91 Day involved Minnesota's public funding scheme,
which distributed government funds to publicly funded candidates based
on independent expenditures made in opposition to their campaign, over
a trigger amount. 92 The Eighth Circuit struck down this provision be-
cause it penalized First Amendment rights.93  The Day court reasoned
that independent groups would be chilled from expending money oppos-
ing a candidate if they knew that doing so would result in government
funds to that candidate's campaign. 94 Accordingly, the rescue funds pro-
vision turned independent expenditures over the trigger amount into de
facto contributions to an opponent's campaign and was, therefore, an
impermissible burden on First Amendment rights.95
In Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election
Practices,96 the First Circuit upheld the rescue funds provision of
Maine's public funding scheme against a constitutional challenge.97
Maine's scheme provided rescue funds to publicly funded candidates and
reduced contribution limits for privately funded candidates to between
$250 and $500, depending on the office sought.98 The court was dismis-
sive of any adverse effect on the complaining party, noting that the
scheme "in no way limits the quantity of speech ... nor ... threaten[s]
89. Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 472
(1st Cir. 2000); N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427,
437-38 (4th Cir. 2008).
90. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994); see Ass'n of Am. Physicians and
Surgeons v. Brewer, 494 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs' complaint
requesting injunction against the Arizona statute stated a cause of action).
91. 34 F.3d at 1358.
92. See id. at 1359.
93. Id. at 1361.
94. Id. at 1360 ("The knowledge that a candidate who one does not want to be elected will...
receive a public subsidy equal to half the amount of the independent expenditure, as a direct result of
that independent expenditure, chills the free exercise of that protected speech.").
95. See id. at 1360-61.
96. 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
97. Id. at 472.
98. Id. at 451-52.
209
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
censure or penalty"99 and, instead, focused on the voluntary nature of the
scheme.100
Recently, the Fourth Circuit has followed Daggett and upheld the
constitutionality of North Carolina's rescue funds for judicial elec-
tions. O1 Duke rejected Day's conclusion that the rescue funds provision
chilled speech, arguing instead that "North Carolina's provision of
matching funds is likely to result in more, not less, speech."10 2  The
Fourth Circuit also held that North Carolina's public funding scheme was
not coercive, in that a candidate might rationally choose not to participate
in the scheme despite the advantages it provided.
10 3
While Day, Daggett, and Duke offer conflicting analyses of the res-
cue funds provision, the holdings of these decisions are at least clear.
The same cannot be said, unfortunately, for Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons v. Brewer.1°4 Brewer involved a coalition of
candidates and independent organizations who brought suit challenging
various aspects of Arizona's public funding scheme, including its provi-
sion for rescue funds.10 5  The district court dismissed the suit, holding
that the plaintiff's challenge to the rescue funds provision failed to state a
claim because the provision was constitutional.1
0 6
On appeal, defendants argued that the case was moot, as the election
at issue had long since passed.10 7 The Ninth Circuit initially agreed and
issued an opinion dismissing the appeal on mootness grounds.'0 8 Soon
thereafter, however, the court withdrew its opinion when it was deter-
mined that the panel's original mootness holding was inconsistent with
prior binding Ninth Circuit precedent.1°9 The court then issued a third
99. Id. at 464.
100. Id. at 466-67.
101. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir.
2008). At the district court level, the case was styled Jackson v. Leake. 476 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D.
N.C. 2006). Plaintiff Jackson, however, was voluntarily dismissed from the case on appeal, and thus
the case was restyled as N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Expenditures v. Leake in the
Fourth Circuit. This, however, has led to some confusion, as on the same day that it handed down its
opinion, the Fourth Circuit also handed down its opinion in the separate case of N.C. Right to Life v.
Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008). On July 24, 2008, plaintiffs' filed a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari with the United States Supreme Court, styled Duke v. Leake. 77 USLW 3074 (U.S. Jul 24,
2008) (NO. 08-120). For consistency, and in order to avoid confusion, for purposes of this article
the Fourth Circuit's decision on the rescue funds provision shall be referred to as Duke v. Leake, or
simply Duke.
102. Duke, 524 F.3d at 438.
103. Id. at 436 ("The plaintiffs do not make coercion a central aspect of their arguments, and,
indeed, we conclude that North Carolina's public financing system is not unconstitutionally coer-
cive. The incentives to choose public funding, while not insubstantial, are rather modest in compari-
son to those in similar systems that have been upheld against First Amendment challenges.").
104. 363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005).
105. Id. at 1198-99.
106. Id. at 1202-03.
107. Assoc. of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer, 486 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g
granted, 494 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 497 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007).
108. Id. at 589.
109. Brewer, 494 F.3d at 1146.
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opinion, clarifying that it had reversed the district court's dismissal, hold-
ing that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action in their challenges to the
public funding scheme, and remanding the case back to the district
court." 0 By finding that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action, the court
appears to have sided with Day in finding the public funding scheme
constitutionally problematic, though the Ninth Circuit's subsequent opin-
ion contains virtually no substantive discussion of the merits of the res-
cue funds challenge.11'
While these four cases are as yet the only decisions dealing explic-
itly with the constitutionality of the rescue funds, several other cases also
warrant further mention. First, in Rosentiel v. Rodriguez," 2 publicly
funded candidates in Minnesota were given an initial distribution of gov-
ernment funds in exchange for agreeing to spending caps. 13 The pub-
licly funded candidates were released from these caps, however, if their
non-publicly funded opponents spent more than a given amount. 4 The
court upheld this provision on the basis that removing the publicly
funded candidate's spending caps did not burden First Amendment
rights.' "
The Sixth Circuit has also dealt with the constitutionality of other
aspects of public funding schemes in two cases. Gable v. Patton" 6 in-
volved a Kentucky scheme where publicly funded candidate slates were
allowed to raise up to $600,000 in private contributions and were given
two dollars in government funding for every privately raised dollar up to
that amount. Further, if a slate of candidates were to face a privately
funded slate that had raised more than $1.8 million, the publicly funded
candidates were released from the otherwise applicable contribution lim-
its and could continue to receive two dollars in government funding for
every dollar raised privately. Despite these very generous benefits, Ga-
ble found that Kentucky's public funding scheme was not coercive and
so was constitutional.' 17
Kentucky's public funding scheme also contained a provision, simi-
lar to the one at issue in Rosentiel, that removed the applicable expendi-
ture limits for publicly funded candidates if an opposing slate of candi-
dates spent more than the trigger amount. While Gable upheld this fea-
ture of the Kentucky scheme, in Anderson v. Spear,' 18 the Sixth Circuit
struck down the definition of "contribution" that applied to Kentucky's
110. Brewer, 497 F.3d at 1057.
Ill. Id.
112. 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996).
113. Id. at 1546.
114. Id. at 1547.
115. Id. at 1557.
116. 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 949.
118. 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004).
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matching funds provision on the grounds that it included contributions by
a candidate to his own campaign. 119 The court held that including candi-
date contributions when calculating the trigger amount served to deter
candidates from contributing funds to their own campaign, and "[t]hus,
by failing to exempt candidate contributions to their own campaigns
from the trigger provision, Kentucky applies an indirect regulation on
expenditures."'
120
2. Davis v. FEC
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. FEC121 provides
important guidance as to how to resolve this conflict among the lower
courts. Davis involved a challenge to the so-called "Millionaire's
Amendment" to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA). 122 This provision tripled the contribution limit applicable to a
candidate when that candidate's opponent had "self-financed" his cam-
paign, that is, where he contributes more than $350,000 to his own cam-
paign.123 Contribution limits for the candidate who had self-financed,
however, were not raised. Jack Davis, a self-financed congressional
candidate in New York, challenged the provision, arguing that he was
deterred from contributing personal funds to his campaign by the knowl-
edge that if he did so he would trigger the deferential contribution lim-
its.124
Davis held that by making the trigger for the asymmetrical contribu-
tion limits turn on the amount of personal spending by Davis on his own
campaign, the Millionaire's Amendment chilled and penalized Davis's
First Amendment rights. 125 Under this scheme, "a candidate who wishes
to [make unlimited personal expenditures had] two choices: abide by a
limit on personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that
right by the activation of a scheme of discriminatory contribution lim-
its.' ' 126 The Court endorsed the rationale of Day to support its conclusion
that the Millionaire's Amendment burdened free speech:
Many candidates who can afford to make large personal ex-
penditures to support their campaigns may choose to do so de-
spite § 319(a), but they must shoulder a special and potentially
significant burden if they make that choice. See Day v. Hola-
han, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-1360 (C.A.8 1994) (concluding that a
Minnesota law that increased a candidate's expenditure limits
119. Id. at 667.
120. Id.
121. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
122. Id. at 2767.
123. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a-l(a)(1)(A) (2002).
124. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2767, 2770.
125. ld.at2771.
126. Id. at 2772.
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and eligibility for public funds based on independent expendi-
tures against her candidacy burdened the speech of those mak-
ing the independent expenditures).
127
Because the Millionaire's Amendment entailed that "the vigorous
exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech
produces fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive con-
text of electoral politics," the Court found that the provision burdened
protected political speech. 1
28
Having found that the Millionaire's Amendment burdened First
Amendment rights, Davis went on to find the provision unconstitutional,
as it was not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
129
According to the Court, the Millionaire's Amendment was not justified
by any anti-corruption interest, as "reliance on personal funds reduces
the threat of corruption."'' 30  Furthermore, the Davis Court rejected the
argument that the Millionaire's Amendment could be justified by a state
interest in "fairness," "equality," or "leveling the playing field" with re-
gard to elections. 31  Quoting a prior opinion by Justice Thomas, the
Court noted that "preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption
are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances."'132 Far from being compel-
ling, the Court held that equality in campaign financing was not even a
legitimate interest of the state. 133 A purported interest in equality justi-
fies restricting speech that would have "ominous implications because it
would permit Congress to arrogate the voters' authority to evaluate the
strengths of candidates competing for office."' 134 Finally, Davis held that
the "resulting drag on First Amendment rights [caused by the Million-
aire's Amendment] is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (noting that the Millionaire's Amendment imposes a substantial burden on the exercise
of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech and thus cannot stand
unless it is "justified by a compelling state interest" (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 256 (1986))).
130. Id. at 2773.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
133. Id.; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (noting that "equal resources" or
"equalizing" is "not... a legally cognizable right" (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)); Austin v. Mich. Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 705 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting as "antithetical to
the First Amendment" "the notion that the govemment has a legitimate interest in restricting the
quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at
48-49 ("[T]he concept that govemment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.").
134. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773.
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consequence of a statutorily imposed choice."' 35  The provision was
therefore unconstitutional.1
36
Davis sheds new light on the constitutionality of rescue funds in
several important respects. First, the Supreme Court endorsed Day's
conclusion that rescue funds burden First Amendment rights of inde-
pendent spenders. 137 This means that Day was right when it struck down
a rescue funds provision that granted government contributions based on
speech by independent groups. 38 Second, like Anderson, Davis involved
contributions made by candidates from personal funds, not independent
expenditures. 39 If the law struck down in Davis was analogous to a res-
cue funds provision in Day, then its holding must likewise apply to res-
cue funds issued based on the spending by a privately funded opponent.
It should also be noted that the constitutionality of the regulation at
issue in Davis did not turn on any calculation of the overall benefits and
burdens involved in the public funding scheme. A state cannot justify
imposing burdens on the speech of non-publicly funded candidates on
the grounds that publicly funded candidates have voluntarily adopted
other burdens, such as voluntary expenditure limits; nor are these bur-
dens justified as a means of encouraging participation in a public funding
scheme.140
3. Can the Rescue Funds Provision Be Saved?
Viewed through the lens of Davis, it is clear that the rescue funds
provision burdens First Amendment rights. As in Davis, the rescue
funds provision presents candidates with a stark choice: "abide by a limit
on personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that
right" by the provision of rescue funds.' 4' Likewise, independent groups
who want to advocate against publicly funded candidates or for their
privately funded opponents must either limit their expenditures, or face
the prospect that their speech will result in additional funding to the can-
didate whose election they oppose. This choice may chill some speech
by privately funded candidates, and it may lead other candidates to face a
"potentially significant burden" based on their speech. 142 As a result,
rescue funds must pass strict scrutiny.
135. Id. at 2764.
136. Id. at 2765.
137. Id. at 2772.
138. See Opinion of the N.J. State Legislature Office of Legislative Servs., 1, July 21, 2008
(concluding that a proposed New Jersey bill creating a public funding scheme with rescue funds
would be unconstitutional under Davis).
139. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2763.
140. Id. at 2772 ("The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply
because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice.").
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1994)).
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Rescue funds are sometimes justified as a means to "level the play-
ing field" between publicly funded candidates and their privately funded
opponents. After Davis, it is obvious that this is not a compelling gov-
ernment interest. 143  But rescue funds do not even have this effect, for
several reasons. First, by providing rescue funds dollar for dollar over
the government's original grant of funds, the publicly funded candidate
will always have more money for campaign speech than her privately
funded opponent. That is because neither the calculation of the trigger
amount nor the calculation of the amount of rescue funds take into ac-
count the fundraising costs incurred by the privately funded candidate in
raising private funds. This can readily account for a third to a half of the
total funds raised. 44
Second, in schemes like North Carolina's, if a group makes inde-
pendent expenditures in support of a publicly funded candidate or oppos-
ing his privately funded opponent, this is not counted in the rescue funds
calculation. 45 If, on the other hand, a group opposes the publicly funded
candidate or supports his or her privately funded opponent, this triggers
rescue funds. 146 Thus, the provision of rescue funds does not achieve
equality even in the sense of dollars spent in support of each campaign.
Finally, rescue funds provisions do not serve an interest in "leveling
the playing field" because they do not take into account the electoral
advantages that come from being an incumbent. Were the rescue funds
provision designed to further equality, it would take into account the
advantages of holding office-an established staff, paid travel, franking
privileges, media access-along with the benefits derived from having
143. Id. at 2773 ("The argument that a candidate's speech may be restricted in order to 'level
electoral opportunities' has ominous implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate the
voters' authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for office."); see also McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (noting that "equal resources" or "equalizing" is "not ... a legally
cognizable right" (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) and Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam))); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (suggesting that a state cannot
"abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in order to enhance the relative
voice of other segments of our society"); Id. at 54 ("[An] ancillary interest in equalizing the relative
financial resources of candidates competing for elective office .... is clearly not sufficient to justify
... infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.").
144. There is not even a requirement that the expenditure triggering rescue funds be adverse to
the interest of the publicly funded candidate who receives the rescue funds. For example, in a three
person race, money spent by Candidate A attacking Candidate B (both privately funded candidates)
would result in a government contribution to Candidate C (a publicly funded candidate) even though
C has benefited from the original expenditure. Likewise, funds gained via expenditures by inde-
pendent groups may be used against a candidate even though, by definition, such expenditures are
outside the candidates control and may not even benefit his candidacy. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47
("[I]ndependent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and
indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expen-
diture with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candi-
date, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate."). By contrast, a privately funded candidate is never eligible for
rescue funds, no matter how much money is spent in opposition to his candidacy or in support of his
participating opponent by independent groups.
145. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (2008).
146. Id.
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run for office before. These advantages are exacerbated under public
funding schemes with rescue funds, which ensures that publicly funded
incumbents can always maintain a funding advantage over a non-
publicly funded challenger, removing the only advantage that challenger
may have. 147 The result of all this is a significant advantage to publicly
funded candidates, particularly incumbents.
This raises two constitutional concerns. First, it brings into question
the sincerity of the claim that the rescue funds are needed to "level the
playing field." Where considerable First Amendment freedoms are at
stake, a state "must demonstrate its commitment to advancing [its] inter-
est by applying its [requirements] evenhandedly.' ' 48 Underinclusiveness
with respect to a given state interest thus belies the claim that the regula-
tion was actually designed to serve this interest. Furthermore, govern-
ment contributions are given to a publicly funded candidate based on the
viewpoint of that speech, which renders them unconstitutional.
149
Since the rescue funds cannot be justified as a way of "leveling the
playing field," they must be justified by the state's interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance thereof.1 50  The use of rescue funds, how-
ever, is not narrowly tailored to advance this interest for two reasons.
First, the state's interest in preventing corruption does not justify burdens
on independent expenditures, 5 since independent spending does not
give rise to the threat of corruption. 152 Second, contributions made by a
candidate to his own campaign, and spending money lawfully raised by a
campaign does not implicate any corruption interest. 153 The rescue funds
provision is therefore not narrowly tailored to any compelling anti-
corruption interest.
Finally, the rescue funds provision cannot be justified as being a
necessary component in a larger public funding scheme. As Davis noted,
the "resulting drag on First Amendment rights [caused by an election
147. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 249 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that "[A]s everyone knows, this is an area in which evenhandedness is not fairness. If all election-
eering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if
incumbents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are fa-
vored.").
148. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
149. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 378, 381 (1992).
150. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008) (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances.")).
151. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,46,53 (1976) (per curiam).
152. Id. at 46 ("[I]ndependent advocacy... does not presently appear to pose dangers of real
or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.").
153. Id. at 53 ("[The prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political process does
not support the limitation on the candidate's expenditure of his own personal funds.... Indeed, the
use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and thereby
counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which the Act's contribution limi-
tations are directed.").
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regulation] is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a conse-
quence of a statutorily imposed choice. ' ' 54 Public funding of elections
may be viewed as desirable by a candidate for a whole host of reasons,
but whatever advantages accrue from the scheme do not justify burden-
ing core political speech.
If the rescue funds provision is so ill-fitted to a state's interests in
equality or the avoidance of corruption, what interest does it actually
serve? First, as indicated above, the provision serves as a form of in-
cumbent protection. By accepting public funding, an incumbent can
ensure that he will not be outspent by an opponent, thus protecting his
incumbency advantage and removing one of the few serious threats to his
re-election.
Second, the rescue funds provision serves the desire to reduce over-
all campaign spending by inducing candidates to accept public funds on
more favorable terms than they could achieve through private means.
Sometimes this goal is explicit. The North Carolina public funding
scheme's stated purpose, for example, is "to protect the constitutional
rights of voters and candidates from the detrimental effects of increas-
ingly large amounts of money being raised and spent to influence the
outcome of elections .... , But even where this purpose is not made
explicit, it is implicit in the way that rescue funds operate. If reducing
the corrupting influence of contributions really were the goal behind pub-
lic funding, a state could achieve this goal by awarding sufficient funds
for a candidate to run an effective campaign' 56 without the necessity of
awarding rescue funds. This would induce virtually all candidates to
sign up for the scheme. Doing this, however, would entail more total
spending on campaigns, not less.
Through the use of a rescue funds provision, the state can keep pub-
lic funding a viable option for candidates without abandoning the
scheme's purpose in reducing total spending. In effect, then, rescue
funds are an attempt to rescue publicly funded candidates not from their
opponents, but from the scheme itself. Needless to say, the state does not
have a compelling interest in reducing the total amount spent on a cam-
154. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2008).
156. In North Carolina, for example, "the base amount of funding for a contested state supreme
court campaign was $216,650" in 2006. Duke v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 2008). By
contrast, Roy Cooper, the winning candidate for Attorney General in 2004, raised $1,574,350 in
campaign contributions. See National Institute on Money in State Politics, Candidate Profile for Roy
Cooper, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/candidate.phtml?c=67817 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2008).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
paign. 157  As such, the provision is unlikely to survive constitutional
scrutiny.
B. The Problem of Disclosure
In order for a rescue funds provision to operate effectively, the state
must have accurate and up-to-date information about expenditures made
by privately funded candidates and independent groups opposing pub-
licly funded candidates. Without this information, the state's promise to
rescue publicly funded candidates from the inadequacy of their public
funding is meaningless. And the only practicable way to get this infor-
mation is through some form of expedited disclosure.
Since the provision of rescue funds to a candidate based on oppos-
ing speech violates the First Amendment, any disclosure scheme directly
tied to a rescue funds provision will likewise be unconstitutional.
158
Even if this were not so, however, the methods of disclosure typically
used in a rescue funds provision would be constitutionally problematic,
as they involve significant burdens on protected political speech which
fall more heavily on privately funded candidates than on publicly funded
ones.
1. General Burdens Caused by Disclosure
While mandatory disclosure may at first blush seem innocuous, dis-
closure requirements have the potential to impose significant burdens on
candidates and independent groups. Potential donors may face retalia-
tion if the fact that they have contributed to a particular candidate or
group becomes public knowledge. Retaliation may come in the form of
social ostracism, 59 economic sanctions,' 6° harassment by vengeful poli-
ticians, 16 or even violence.1 62 A soldier who donates to pro-gay causes
157. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 9 (holding that expenditure limits were unconstitutional because
they "necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached").
158. See, e.g., Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2775 ("The § 319(b) disclosure requirements were designed
to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in § 319(a), and as discussed above,
§ 319(a) violates the First Amendment. In light of that holding, the burden imposed by the § 319(b)
requirements cannot be justified, and it follows that they too are unconstitutional.").
159. Bradley A. Smith, A Moderate, Modem Campaign Reform Agenda, 12 NEXUS 3, 15
(2007) (noting that some people "would not want their contributions to the Log Cabin Republicans,
an organization of gay Republicans, to be disclosed publicly").
160. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995) (noting that the desire
to contribute anonymously to a political organization or campaign "may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation").
161. Smith, supra note 164, at 15 (noting that some contributors "will prefer to give anony-
mously in order to avoid retaliations by vengeful politicians"); see also Ben Smith, Obama lawyer
warns of 'reckoning' for Clinton 527 donors and staff, POLrICO, Feb. 21, 2008,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0208/Obama-lawyer.warns.of-reckoning-for_Clinton_52
7_donors and -staff.html; Michael Luo, Group Plans Campaign Against G.O.P. Donors, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, available at http:/lwww.nytimes.com2008/08/08/us/politics/O8donate.html
(detailing letter sent by group Accountable America warning donors to conservative 527 groups of
exposure).
162. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958).
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may risk being discharged under the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy. 163 A union member or corporate employee may risk ostracism or
be denied advancement if he or she contributes to candidates or causes
not in line with those of management.' 64 Businessmen and other profes-
sionals may not want to alienate potential customers,165 and those whose
careers depend on reputation and avoiding controversy, such as doctors,
ministers, or journalists, may not wish to have their political views pub-
licly advertised. 166  The risk of retaliation is particularly acute for indi-
viduals who contribute to "unpopular or unconventional" causes and
candidates.1 67  And recent advances in computer technology and the
availability of readily-searchable, digitized information on the Internet
only exacerbate this problem.' 
68
Even apart from any risk of retaliation, compelled disclosure of con-
tributor information raises serious privacy concerns. In Buckley, the Su-
preme Court recognized that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seri-
ously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the
First Amendment."1 69  Legal protections for privacy have multiplied in
recent years, forbidding the disclosure of personal information in a wide
variety of areas. Likewise, courts have long recognized the importance
of protecting privacy in the political arena and have repeatedly invali-
dated restrictions on anonymous political speech.1
70
163. See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 216-18 (D.D.C. 1998) (considering a sailor
discharged for discussing his sexual orientation in an anonymous online profile).
164. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 237 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Rank-and-file union members or rising junior executives may ... think
twice before making even modest contributions to a candidate who is disfavored by the union or
management hierarchy. Similarly, potential contributors may well decline to take the obvious risks
entailed in making a reportable contribution to the opponent of a well-entrenched incumbent.").
165. See Leigh Jones, Boycott Threatened Over Meeting Site of Association of American Law
Schools, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.law.comljsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp
?id=1202423529779.
166. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution
Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17 (2003) ("Those who rely on trust and identification with
others to do their work-such as ministers, psychotherapists, or schoolteachers-may find their roles
undermined if congregants, patients, or parents know and judge their personal political activity.").
167. Id. at 22.
168. Id. at 11-12 ("In the last five years, campaign contribution disclosure suddenly joined the
trend of online compilation and availability. This change in technology qualitatively transformed the
nature of disclosure laws. No longer can a contributor assume that disclosed information is unlikely
to be seen by anyone. The law remains the same, but its effect is entirely different." (footnotes
omitted)).
169. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (emphasis added).
170. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153, 159-60, 169
(2002) (striking down ban on anonymous solicitation); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found.,
525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999) (finding that a person gathering petition signatures retains an anonymity
interest); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding unconstitutional
an Ohio law mandating disclosure for low level, individual expenditures regarding a ballot initia-
tive); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-66 (1960) (striking down a California law prohibiting
anonymous leafleting regarding a commercial dispute); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466
(1958) (striking down a state law mandating disclosure of members).
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Fear of retaliation and concern over privacy undoubtedly deters
some potential donors from making contributions to candidates and in-
dependent groups where they know disclosure will be required. This
chilling effect may be significant. In a 2007 survey, fifty-six percent of
respondents objected to having their name and address posted on the
Internet as a contributor, and seventy-one percent objected to having
their employer's name listed. 171  Sixty percent said they would think
twice about contributing if their name and address would be disclosed,
and forty-nine percent said the same if their employer were reported.
1 72
Among the reasons listed for this reluctance were: "I would never want
my employer to know who I give money to," and fear "that [disclosure]
would jeopardize my job."'173 Courts have also taken judicial notice of
the deterrent effect compelled disclosure can have.
1 74
Compelled disclosure can also impose significant burdens on candi-
dates and groups in terms of the time and effort needed to comply with
the specified disclosure requirements. For example, Citizens for Respon-
sible Government State Political Action Committee v. Davidson 75 in-
volved a challenge to the disclosure requirements of the Colorado Fair
Campaign Practices Act. 176  Under the Colorado law, independent ex-
penditures exceeding $1,000 had to be reported to all candidates and to
the Secretary of State. This notice had to be in writing and had to in-
clude: "(1) the amount of the expenditure, (2) a 'detailed description' of
the use of the expenditure, and (3) the name of the candidate whom the
expenditure is intended to support or oppose."' 177 Violations were pun-
ishable by a "'penalty of ten dollars per day for each day that a statement
or other information required to be filed ... is not filed by the close of
business on the day due."" 178 As the Davidson court recognized, "[tlo
require such immediate notice severely burdens First Amendment
rights."'
' 79
171. See DICK M. CARPENTER H, INST. FOR JUSTICE, DISCLOSURE COSTS: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 7 (2007), available at http://www.ij.org/images
/pdf-folder/other-pubs/DisclosureCosts.pdf.
172. Id.
173. ld. at 9.
174. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam); see also McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 227-29 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting evidence of retaliation and deterred contributions
ranging from: large numbers of contributions at just below the disclosure trigger amount; to vandal-
ism after disclosure; to non-contribution because of concerns about a group's ability to retain confi-
dentiality; to concerns about employers, neighbors, other business entities, and others knowing of
support for causes that are not popular everywhere and the results of such disclosure); AFL-CIO v.
FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting statements by labor organizations "that releasing
the names of hundreds of volunteers, members, and employees will make it more difficult for the
organization to recruit future personnel").
175. 236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000).
176. Id. at 1181, 1197.
177. Id. at 1196 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-113(4) (2000)).
178. Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-113(4) (2000) (alteration in original)).
179. Id. at 1197.
220 [Vol. 86:1
2008] FUTURE OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING 221
Individuals or groups who fail to meet these requirements can face
serious penalties based on what amount to technical violations of the law.
In 1996, for example, California imposed an $808,000 fine (the largest
ever) on Russell Howard and Steve Cicero (president and treasurer) of
Californians Against Corruption (CAC), a small grassroots organization
that only spent $103,091 in an unsuccessful effort to oust by recall a
powerful state senator whom they considered to be corrupt.1 80 In the
flurry of activity and with few resources, CAC had trouble keeping up
with the reporting of the name, address, occupation, and employer of
anyone contributing over $100.181 The information was always re-
quested, but contributors did not always follow up with the needed in-
formation.1 82 California's Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC)
levied the maximum $2,000 per violation for each failure to provide a
piece of the required information, even though the total was about eight
times the total amount spent, and most of the contributors' addresses
were provided on copies of the checks given to the FPPC.
1 83
2. Specific Burdens Caused by Disclosure under Rescue Funds
Provisions
Aside from the sorts of burdens mentioned above-which apply to
most election-related disclosure-the disclosure requirements commonly
imposed by a rescue funds provision also impose additional burdens.
Specifically, compelled disclosure under a rescue funds provision re-
quires the disclosure of campaign spending which exposes the privately
funded candidate's campaign strategy, thus undermining her ability to
engage in "effective advocacy" and to wage an effective campaign.
184
This is especially true where, as with most rescue funds provisions, dis-
closure requirements are asymmetrical, placing more stringent reporting
burdens on privately funded candidates.
Under the disclosure requirements of North Carolina's scheme, for
example, privately funded candidates with publicly funded opponents are
required to "report total income, expenses, and obligations to the Board
by facsimile machine or electronically within 24 hours after the total
amount of campaign expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or
borrowed, exceeds eighty percent (80%) of the trigger for rescue funds,"




183. Id. During the proceedings, "the FPPC explicitly stated as an aggravating factor that
Howard told a newspaper reporter that 'the little guy can't participate [in politics] without running
afoul of technical violations."' Brian Doherty, How Campaign Finance Law Hurts Participation in
Politics, REASON, Apr. 2001, available at http://www.reason.com/news/printer/32341 .html.
184. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Cf. AFL-CIO v.
FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting compelled disclosure of "confidential internal
materials" violates privacy right and "seriously interferes with internal group operations and effec-
tiveness").
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and must file periodic reports thereafter according to an expedited report-
ing schedule set by the North Carolina Board of Elections. 85 Likewise,"any entity making independent expenditures in support of or opposition
to a [publicly funded] candidate or in support of a candidate opposing a
[publicly funded] candidate" is required to "report the total funds re-
ceived, spent, or obligated for those expenditures ...to the Board by
facsimile machine or electronically within 24 hours after the total amount
of expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or borrowed, for the
purpose of making the independent expenditures.., exceeds five thou-
sand dollars ($5,000)."' 186 Subsequently, such groups must follow the
same expedited reporting schedule as privately funded candidates. Dis-
closure is not required, however, for independent expenditures made in
opposition to a publicly funded candidate.
87
Electoral politics is a zero-sum game, and any benefit conferred on
one candidate is by its very nature a disadvantage to his opponents. Re-
quired reporting, both as to actual and planned expenditures (obliga-
tions), can provide valuable information to an opposing candidate as to
when major media buys and other readily-identifiable, big-ticket ex-
penses are in the works, all long before they would be known under the
regular reporting required of all candidates. Information on spending is
strategic information that a candidate would ordinarily keep private until
all candidates are equally required to disclose their activities. These on-
going, unilateral disclosures of strategic information impose a clear
handicap, and also disincentives, on speech by privately funded candi-
dates.
3. How to Deal with Disclosure
The fact that compelled disclosure imposes burdens on First
Amendment rights does not mean that all disclosure requirements are
unconstitutional. It does mean, however, that the "significant encroach-
ments" on privacy and speech caused by mandatory disclosure "cannot
be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental inter-
est." 188 In Buckley, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of disclosure requirements. First, as a thresh-
old requirement, the affected speech or activity be unambiguously cam-
paign related. 89 Second, if the law passes this threshold requirement, a
disclosure requirement "must survive exacting scrutiny."'190
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.66(a), (b) (2008).
186. Id. § 163-278.66(a).
187. See id. § 163-278.66(b).
188. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64).
189. See N. C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 281 (2008) ("[A]fter Buckley, campaign
finance laws may constitutionally regulate only those actions that are 'unambiguously related to the
campaign of a particular ... candidate.' " (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80) (alterations in the origi-
nal)).
190. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
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a. The Unambiguously Campaign Related Threshold
Requirement
Buckley held that disbursements for political speech may not be
subjected to compelled disclosure, unless they are for communications
"unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candi-
date," to assure that "the relation of the information sought to the pur-
poses of the Act [was not] too remote," 191 and to ensure that the provi-
sion only "shed[s] the light of publicity on spending that is unambigu-
ously campaign related."
192
Buckley applied this unambiguously-campaign-related requirement
to: (1) expenditure limitations, 193 (2) Political Action Committee (PAC)
status and disclosure,' 94 (3) non-PAC disclosure of contributions and
independent expenditures, 195 and (4) contributions. 196 Because Buckley
expressly applied this unambiguously-campaign-related requirement to
the disclosure of expenditures,'97 it has direct application to the disclo-
sures required to provide rescue funds.
Buckley employed two tests to implement this unambiguously-
campaign-related requirement. First, for determining PAC status, Buck-
ley endorsed the major-purpose test for "political committees."'
198 "Ex-
penditures of candidates and of 'political committees' so construed can
be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Con-
gress. They are, by definition, campaign related."'99 Second, to limit
the speech subject to FECA to only campaign-related speech, the Court
created the express-advocacy test, i.e., whether a communication con-
tains explicit words expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate. 200 This test assures that expenditures are
"unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candi-
date."2 0 '
191. Id. at 80.
192. Id. at 81.
193. Id. at 42-44.
194. Id. at 79.
195. Id. at 79-81. "Independent expenditure" is a term of art referring to an express-advocacy
communication that is not coordinated with a candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006).
196. Id. at 23 n.24, 78 ("So defined, 'contributions' have a sufficiently close relationship to the
goals of the Act, [i.e., regulating elections,] for they are connected with a candidate or his cam-
paign.").
197. Id. at 80.
198. Id. at 79 ("To fulfill the purposes of the Act, [i.e., regulating elections,] they need only
encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is
the nomination or election of a candidate."); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S.
238, 252 n.6 (1986) (reaffirming major purpose test).
199. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 44, 80; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262 (holding that the major purpose of an organization
was determined by express-advocacy "independent spending").
201. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
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The Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL 1/)202 also lim-
ited the BCRA's new "electioneering communication ' 2°3 corporate pro-
hibition ° 4 to only "campaign speech, 20 5 when it stated its test for the
extent of the prohibition: an ad may be prohibited "only if the ad is sus-
ceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate.,, 206 So WRTL Irs appeal-to-vote test
was the application of the unambiguously-campaign-related requirement
to electioneering communications, just as the express-advocacy test was
the Buckley Court's application of the requirement to reporting inde-
pendent expenditures and the major-purpose test was its application of
the requirement to determination of PAC status.
The purpose of the unambiguously-campaign-related requirement-
and the appeal-to-vote test applying it-is twofold. Negatively, it con-
fines government within the pale of its constitutional authority to regu-
late elections.20 7  Positively, it protects what WRTL II called "political
speech,'2  a term it equated with "genuine issue ads, or "issue advo-
cacy, ' ' 2t ° as distinguished from "campaign speech" or "express advo-
cacy. WRTL H explained that "[i]ssue advocacy conveys information
,,212and educates, and reaffirmed Buckley's statement that, because issue
advocacy and candidate advocacy often look alike, bright-line tests are
required to protect political speech, or issue advocacy, from being
chilled.21 3 And to remove any doubt as to the necessity of speech-
protective lines, WRTL H reiterated that "the benefit of any doubt [goes]
to protecting rather than stifling speech. 214
As explained, the disclosure requirements tied to rescue funds are
often triggered by spending by the privately funded opponent or by inde-
pendent expenditures of third party groups. Since such speech is cam-
202. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
203. Under BCRA, "electioneering communication" was defined as "any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which- (I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is
made within- (aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the
candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a
political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and
(111) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or
Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate." 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006).
204. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
205. WRTL /, 127 S. Ct. at 2672 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 2667.
207. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (per curiam) ("The constitutional power of Con-
gress to regulate federal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties in
this case." (footnote omitted and emphasis added)).
208. WRTL /, 127 S. Ct. at 2659.
209. Id. at 2659 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003)).
210. Id. at 2667.
211. Id. at 2659 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205-206).
212. Id. at 2667.
213. Id. at 2669.
214. Id. at 2667; see also id. at 2669 n.7, 2674.
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paign speech, 15 then the disclosure requirements would be unambigu-
ously campaign related. Whether disclosure was constitutional, therefore,
would depend on whether the disclosure provision passed strict scrutiny.
b. Strict Scrutiny
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has been clear that election-
related disclosure requirements are subject to "exacting scrutiny. ' '21 6 It
has been less clear, however, in defining exactly what sort of scrutiny
this "exacting scrutiny" requires. Some courts have held that exacting
scrutiny is simply a synonym for strict scrutiny and that compelled dis-
closure based on core political speech must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest to be constitutional, regardless of the
level of burden that disclosure placed on the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights.21 7 Other courts have applied a lesser standard of scrutiny
when evaluating the constitutionality of mandatory disclosure provi-
218sions.
Evidence that "exacting scrutiny" means strict scrutiny can be found
in the Buckley decision itself. In its discussion of the disclosure require-
ments, for example, the Buckley Court expressly described "exacting
scrutiny" as "[t]he strict test," and included a discussion of "least restric-
tive means" in its analysis,2 19 a hallmark of strict scrutiny.22  When
Buckley turned next to consider compelled disclosure for persons making
independent expenditures and certain contributions, it said that it "must
apply the same strict standard of scrutiny" as it had just applied to the
previous disclosure provision to protect the "right of associational pri-
vacy. , 221 More tellingly, Buckley also used "exacting scrutiny" to de-
scribe the level of scrutiny given to the expenditure limits at issue in the
case. 222  The Supreme Court has also explicitly linked "exacting scru-tiny" with strict scrutiny in other contexts in Buckley v. American Consti-
215. If, however, the disclosure requirements on independent spending went beyond express
advocacy communications to require the disclosure of issue advocacy, the disclosure requirements
would be unconstitutional as not being campaign related.
216. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam).
217. See Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 787 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the "'exacting scrutiny' standard in Buckley was later characterized by the Court as requiring that a
restriction on corporate political expenditures be 'narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."' (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990))); AFL-CIO v.
FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 176 (2003) (stating that Buckley "conclud[ed] that the disclosure requirements..
* survived strict scrutiny"); Cal. Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1101 n.16 (9th Cir.
2003) ("[W]e subject California's disclosure requirements to strict scrutiny."); R.I. ACLU v. Begin,
431 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235 (D.R.I. 2006) (stating that disclosure requirements "are subject to 'strict'
or 'exacting' scrutiny").
218. Duke v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 439 (4th Cir. 2008); C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583
F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that disclosure regulations for express ballot measure advo-
cacy may be enacted "without a showing of a compelling state interest").
219. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
220. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
221. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 44.
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tutional Law Foundation (Buckley I/), 223 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,22 4 and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.2 25
To date, one of the best attempts to synthesize these seemingly in-
consistent lines of cases is Justice Thomas's concurrence in Buckley 11.226
Justice Thomas begins his analysis by addressing a puzzling feature of
constitutional jurisprudence, namely that political speech concerning
elections is often subject to greater regulation than is non-election related
speech. The answer to this puzzle lies in the state's authority to regulate
elections. 227 States must hold elections, and this necessity requires regu-
lations of the various aspects of the election process.228  To require that
every election regulation pass strict scrutiny "would tie the hands of
States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and effi-
ciently. 229 Since it would not be appropriate or practicable to subject
every election-related law to strict scrutiny, courts have developed a spe-
cial framework for addressing the constitutionality of some sorts of elec-
tion-related regulations. Under this framework, while regulations that
impose significant burdens on freedom of speech and association remain
subject to strict scrutiny, regulations imposing light burdens are subject
to a lesser standard of review. 230  However, when an election-regulated
regulation burdens core political speech, the Supreme Court has "ordi-
narily applied strict scrutiny without first determining that the State's law
severely burdens speech ' 23 ' because "restrictions on core political speech
223. 525 U.S. 182, 192 n.12 (1999) ("Our decision is entirely in keeping with the 'now-settled
approach' that state regulations 'impos[ing] 'severe burdens' on speech ...[must] be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." (citation omitted)). Although the Court used strict
scrutiny language, it concluded that the challenged provisions were "no more than tenuously related
to the substantial interests disclosure serves," so that they "'fail exacting scrutiny."' Id. at 204.
(citing Am. Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1105 (10th Cir. 1997)).
224. 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting
scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest."); see also id. at 348 (referring to exacting scrutiny as "the strictest standard of review").
225. 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) ("[When] exacting scrutiny [is] necessitated ... 'the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,' 'and the burden is on the
government to show the existence of such an interest."' (citations omitted)); but see McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (holding that disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Act were constitutional because they served "important state interests").
226. Buckley 11, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
227. See, e.g., id. (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4)).
228. Buckley 11, 525 U.S. at 206. (Thomas, J., concurring).
229. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
230. Buckley 11, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("When a State's rule imposes severe
burdens on speech or association, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest; lesser
burdens trigger less exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests are typically
enough to justify reasonable restrictions.").
231. Id. at 207.
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so plainly impose a 'severe burden.' 23 2 This analysis appears to have
in 233been adopted by the Court in Davis.
The provision of rescue funds and the accompanying disclosure,
however, are not necessary to conduct elections in the way that, say,
regulations concerning voting, ballots, and candidate eligibility are. The
justification for lower scrutiny of some election-related regulations-that
such regulations are necessary to effectuate the state's obligation to hold
fair elections-would therefore not apply to compelled disclosure under
the rescue funds provisions. 234
A word should also be said here about the use of synonyms in Su-
preme Court opinions, which can cause confusion or be used in an at-
tempt to evade the required strict scrutiny. Writing is often enhanced by
the use of synonyms to avoid repetition of the same term, so it is com-
mon to find synonyms in legal opinions as a stylistic device. But where,
as in Supreme Court legal opinions, advocates may attempt to place
heavy reliance on any variant reading, precision is preferred. Confusing
synonyms are often used without any intent to change the analysis, and
analytical language often changes over time.
For example, McIntyre used "overriding," not "compelling," to de-
scribe the required strict-scrutiny standard.235 In Bellotti, the Court spoke
of "exacting scrutiny" as requiring the State to "show[] a subordinating
interest which is compelling," and "means 'closely drawn to avoid un-
necessary abridgment .... ,,,236 Bellotti also referred to "exacting scru-
tiny" as "critical scrutiny, 237 and after further analysis held that
"[a]ssuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling'
interest . . . we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the
governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appel-
lants from speaking., 238 While Bellotti employed standard strict-scrutiny
language by speaking of a "compelling interest," the "narrow tailoring"
requirement was described with synonyms that might lead one to mistak-
enly believe that some intermediate standard applied-or even that the
Court was speaking of the relevant-and-substantial-relation requirement
that it had stated in Buckley in the disclosure context. From these exam-
ples, it is apparent that the use of synonyms does not alter the required
level of scrutiny.
232. Id. at 208 (citation omitted).
233. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008) ("[T]he strength of the governmental interest
[justifying disclosure] must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment
rights.").
234. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
235. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
236. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (outlining Buckley's contribution-limit analysis using intermediate
scrutiny)).
237. See id. at 786-87.
238. Id. at 795 (citation omitted).
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4. Are There Compelling Reasons for Compelled Disclosure?
In Buckley, the Supreme Court found that there were three govern-
ment interests sufficiently compelling to justify some form of disclosure:
(1) an informational interest in allowing voters to know who was finan-
cially supporting a given candidate's campaign; (2) an anti-corruption
interest in deterring both actual corruption and its appearance; and (3) an
enforcement interest allowing a state to more easily detect violations of
its contribution limits. 239 The third interest obviously has no application
to disclosure under the rescue funds provision, as the disclosure require-
ments apply to independent expenditures and the campaign spending of
opposing candidates, for which contribution limits do not apply. 240 The
first two interests, however, warrant further comment.
a. Informational Interest
The first interest cited by Buckley as potentially justifying com-
pelled disclosure was informational. Disclosure "provides the electorate
with information 'as to where political campaign money comes from and
how it is spent by the candidate' in order to aid the voters in evaluating
those who seek federal office., 24 1 Done appropriately, disclosure "al-
lows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more pre-
cisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and cam-
paign speeches," and can "alert the voter to the interests to which a can-
didate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of
future performance in office."242
Disclosure requirements associated with rescue funds provisions
will generally not be narrowly tailored to this interest. As discussed
above, under the disclosure requirements of North Carolina's scheme
privately funded candidates with publicly funded opponents are required
to "report total income, expenses, and obligations to the Board by fac-
simile machine or electronically within twenty-four hours after the total
amount of campaign expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or
borrowed, exceeds eighty percent (80%) of the trigger for rescue funds,"
and must file periodic reports thereafter according to an expedited report-
ing schedule set by the North Carolina Board of Elections.243 Likewise,
"[a]ny entity making independent expenditures in support of or opposi-
tion to a [publicly funded] candidate or in support of a candidate oppos-
239. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
240. In McConnell, the Supreme Court expanded the understanding of data-gathering as a
compelling interest in holding that the important state interest of "gathering the data necessary to
enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions" applies to "the entire range of electioneering
communications." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (emphasis added). Even as broadened by
McConnell, however, the state's interest in data-gathering has no relevance to the rescue funds
provision.
241. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67.
242. ld. at 67.
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.66(a) (2008).
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ing a [publicly funded] candidate" is required to report the total funds
received, spent, or obligated for those expenditures or payments to the
Board by facsimile machine or electronically within 24 hours after the
total amount of expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or bor-
rowed, for the purpose of making the independent expenditures or elec-
tioneering communications exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).244
Again, such groups must follow the same expedited reporting
schedule as privately funded candidates. The disclosure requirements
imposed by the rescue funds provision are also far more burdensome
than would be necessary for the state to achieve legitimate informational
*24interests.24s Under the disclosure requirements, candidates and inde-
pendent groups must report contributions, obligations, and expenditures
within 24 hours. The State's interest in disclosure is served so long as
disclosure is made before the election and with enough time for voters to
make informed voting decisions.
The disclosure burden required by a rescue funds provision is also
often unilateral. Publicly funded candidates are only required to file a
few reports during the election campaign, and these reports need not be
made on any sort of expedited basis.246 Similarly, the disclosure re-
quirements for independent expenditures differ greatly according to
whether the expenditures involve a publicly funded or privately funded
candidate. In North Carolina, for example, disclosure is not required
under the rescue funds provision for independent expenditures made in
opposition to a candidate opposing a publicly funded candidate, i.e. to
independent expenditures opposing a privately funded candidate.247
Where considerable First Amendment freedoms are at stake, a state must
"demonstrate its commitment to advancing [its] interest by applying its
[requirements] evenhandedly. 248 The rescue funds provision's disclo-
sure requirements, however, do not do this.
In any event, the public will receive full information about cam-
paign contributions and receipts in the less-restrictive quarterly and pre-
election reports that both candidates must file, and in the normal inde-
pendent expenditure reports that groups must file, so the special, unilat-
eral disclosure requirements are redundant as to any public informational
interest. Any asserted informational interest would be "insubstantial
244. Id.
245. See Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1197 (2001)
("None of the State's compelling interests in informing the electorate, preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption, or gathering data would be at all compromised by a more workable dead-
line.").
246. See, e.g., § 163-278.66(a), (b).
247. § 163-278.66(b).
248. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
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because voters may identify [the relevant information] under [other] pro-
visions. 249
b. Anti-Corruption Interest
Compelled disclosure has also been justified as a means of deterring
actual and apparent corruption. 250  Disclosure can act as a safeguard
against corruption in two ways. First, the exposure that comes from dis-
closure "may discourage those who would use money for improper pur-
poses either before or after the election., 25' In addition, a "public armed
with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better
able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in re-
turn. , ,252
The disclosure requirements provided for under typical rescue funds
provisions, however, are not narrowly tailored to the state's interest in
preventing actual or apparent corruption. First, the rescue funds provi-
sions' disclosure requirements apply to independent and candidate ex-
penditures. These expenditures pose no threat of corruption. 3 In addi-
tion to requiring disclosure based on expenditures, compelled disclosure
under a rescue funds provision also typically applies once a candidate
has received contributions over some set amount (usually a percentage of
the trigger amount). In North Carolina, for example, disclosure is re-
quired once the total contributions by a privately funded candidate com-
bined with the total of independent expenditures made in support of that
privately funded candidate and in opposition to his publicly funded op-
25ponent reach 80% of the trigger amount. 25 Yet, if anything, the corrupt-
ing influence a contribution has is likely to decrease the more total funds
a candidate has raised, as each individual contribution will make up a
smaller percentage of the total. A contribution is no less likely to have a
corrupting influence on candidates who do not end up raising 80% of the
trigger amount than on candidates who do. Despite this fact, reporting is
required for the latter, but not the former. Likewise, whether a contribu-
tion is corrupting does not depend on whether a candidate's opponent is
publicly funded or privately funded. Yet disclosure is only required for
privately funded candidates who face publicly funded opponents. Thus,
compelled disclosure required by the rescue funds provision does not
serve an anti-corruption interest.
249. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1981) ("It is
clear, therefore, that [the challenged disclosure provision] does not advance a legitimate governmen-
tal interest significant enough to justify its infringement of First Amendment rights.").
250. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (reaffirming Buckley's holding regarding the
unconstitutionality of expenditure limits); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (suggesting that independent
expenditures do not pose threat of corruption).
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.66(a) (2008).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Concern about corruption, in the judiciary as much as in other
branches of government, is a matter of great importance. One should not
make the mistake, however, of equating increases in the amount of mon-
ey spent on judicial campaigns with an increase in corruption. Further-
more, if states are going to adopt measures designed to combat corrup-
tion, they must take care that the proposed antidotes do not impose un-
constitutional burdens on the First Amendment rights of judicial candi-
dates or independent groups. If a state does attempt to restrict protected
speech via election regulations, whether through bans on personal solici-
tation, rescue funds based on opposing speech, or burdensome and
asymmetrical disclosure, this will only serve to deform, rather than re-
form, the judicial election process.

